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RISK, INSURANCE AND DEFAULT IN A RURAL CREDIT MARKET
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA
Abstract

This paper examines the role played by credit transactions in permitting
households to cope with risk in an environment characterized by incomplete
markets and imperfect information.

Within small communities in northern

Nigeria credit transactions play a direct role in pooling risk between
households through the use of contracts which make owed repayments depend on
the realization of random shocks by both borrowers and lenders.

The aim of

the paper is to consider the institutional and informational context_which
permits state-contingent loan contracts to be made and enforced. The paper
presents a model of a bilateral credit relationship which can accommodate a
wide range of informational environments and which explicitly incorporates the
contractual enforcement mechanisms available in these villages.

The terms of

the loan contract are negotiated with each household taking into account the
fact that, depending on the realized state of nature, the other may default on
its obligations.

The structure of an econometric model is derived from the

Nash bargaining solution.

The results support the hypothesis that loan

repayments include state-contingent payments that serve to pool risk between
the borrower and the lender.

The research is based on a year long survey in

Zaria, Nigeria conducted by the author.
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1
Risk is a central fact of life in rural areas of less developed
countries.

There is a vast, mainly theoretical literature that explores its

consequences for individual behavio~ and the evolution of institutions. 1

In

the absence of complete insurance markets, households utilize a variety of
economic strategies in order to mitigate the consequences of this risk.

This

paper uses a unique data set to analyze in some detail one institution that
plays an important role in allowing households to cope with risk.
Credit transactions take on a special role when insurance markets are
incomplete by allowing households to smooth their consumption streams in the
face of random income fluctuations.

This observation, of course, is the basis

of much of the literature on the intertemporal allocation of consumption
(e.g., Zeldes [1989]).

Eswaran and Kotwal (1989) provide an extension of this

theoretical work to joint production and consumption decisions in agriculture
in LDCs.

Recently, empirical studies of credit markets LDCs have begun to

take explicit account of intertemporal consumption-smoothing in the face of
income shocks as a motivation for credit transactions (Rosenzweig [1990],
Morduch [1990]).

In northern Nigeria, the credit market seems to play a more

direct role in households' risk management.

In earlier work based on a survey

in northern Nigeria (Udry [1990, 199la]), I argue that the repayment owed on a
loan depends upon random production and consumption shocks received by both
the borrower and the lender, permitting these households to insure each other
directly against idiosyncratic risk.

State-contingent loan contracting

permits more efficient risk pooling between borrowers and lenders, and allows
credit transactions in this Islamic region to conform to the prohibition of
fixed interest lending by Shari'a law.
1See

Bardhan (1989) and Bell (1988) for references.
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My goal in this paper is to consider these loan transactions in their
institutional context, that is, to examine the personalized interaction
between borrower .and lender in the ·setting of a village economy.

The result

is a structural econometric model of the determinants of net borrowing or
lending, the repayment owed by the borrower (including, inter alia any state
contingent adjustment of this quantity), and the decision by the borrower as
to whether to default on his obligations. 2

I am able to establish exclusion

restrictions which permit the decision to default on a loan and the
determination of the state-contingen t amount owed on a loan to be identified
separately.

Furthermore, I am able to consider the actual contractual

mechanisms through which the repayments owed on a loan are made state
contingent.
I am able to shed light on these details by excluding from consideration
the general equilibrium properties of state-contingen t loan contracting, which
are the focus of Udry (1991a).

There are only three actors in this paper.

Two are households which may transact credit.

One of these two is called "the

household" or "the sample household"; the other is "the transaction partner,"
or "the partner."

The final actor has no independent motivation and would in

other contexts be called the court system.

Here it is the community or family

authority concerned with monitoring and enforcing contracts.
In section A I provide some background information concerning credit
transactions in northern Nigeria and describe the physical and information
environment faced by the household and its transaction partner.

I describe

the contractual form of the loan transactions and the community-based
2

There have been relatively few attempts to estimate structural models of
informal credit transactions in developing countries. See Iqbal (1981),
Kochar (1991), and Bell, Srinivasan and Udry (1991).

3
mechanisms which serve to enforce the contracts in section B.

These

observations serve as the basis for the model of a bilateral credit
relationship with state-contingent repayments which is introduced in the same
section.
Enforcement of these credit contracts is not perfect; 10 percent of all
loans are defaulted by the borrower. 3

Section C, therefore, is devoted to

the decision by the borrower as to whether to default on his repayment
obligations.

In section DI derive the indirect expected utility of the

household and its transaction partner as a function of the contractual terms
of the loan.

In section E, I describe the equilibrium loan size and repayment

using the natural symmetrical Nash bargaining solution.

In order to account

for the one-fifth of sample households which do not participate on either side
of the credit market, the possibility of transactions costs is introduced in
this section.

This study is based on a survey of 196 households in four

northern Nigerian villages.

I provide a brief description of the study area

and survey methodology in section F, along with a discussion of the variables
used in the analysis.

In section G, I develop an econometric specification

based on the bargaining solution to the bilateral model.
are presented in section H.

Estimation results

The most important finding is that state

contingent payments are embedded in the loan repayments, and that these
payments serve to pool risk between the borrower and the lender.
A. Risk and Information Flow within the Village.
The four villages are small (an average of 366 resident households) but
not isolated.

Three quarters of the households produce vegetables and non

food cash crops for the market, over half of the labor used on farms is hired,
3

The definition of a defaulted loan is described in section F.
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and virtually all land is treated with modern chemical fertilizer.

All of the

sample households name farming as their primary occupation.
Loans in these villages are quite informal.
witnesses or written records.

They are made without

Although the borrower and lender negotiate over

the size of the loan, explicit interest rates or repayment dates are almost
never set.

The loans are made between individuals who are well-known to each

other and who share a great deal of information about each others' farming
activities and household events; neither formal sector lending institutions
nor specialized private moneylenders participate in the credit market.

97

percent of loans (weighted by value) are between neighbors or between
relatives.

For 82 percent of loans, survey participants were able to provide

an accounting of activities on the farms of those from whom they borrowed, or
to whom they lent (Udry [1990, p. 259]).

Common institutional adaptations to

information asymmetries are not found in this credit market.

There is no

evidence of contractual interlinkages involving loans, and only 3 percent of
loans (by value) are backed by collateral (Udry [1990, section III]). 4
The free flow of information within these rural communities facilitates
the practice of implicitly embedding insurance contracts within loan
transactions.

The survey data show that realized rates of return are lower

and repayment periods are longer for debtor households which have received
adverse shocks (table 1).

This observation is consistent with standard credit

contracts because debtors who receive adverse shocks are more likely to
default.

4

There is also evidence, however, that repayments respond to the

0n the role of collateral and contractual interlinkages in credit
transactions subject to moral hazard or adverse selection, see Chan and Thakor
(1987), Bell (1988), Stiglitz and Weiss (1986), and Rogerson (1985). See Udry
(1991b, chapter 2) for more a complete set of references.
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circumstances of the lending household (table 1).

This finding is not

consistent with conventional models of loan contracting, nor with credit
contracts in the .form of equity investments by the lender in the borrower's
activities. 5

Rather, these loans appear to be true risk pooling arrangements

between the two households.
The existence of these state-contingent contracts raises the possibility
that the allocation of resources might approximate that which would be
achieved with complete competitive markets.

A number of studies have recently

explored this possibility in other contexts (Altonji and Hayashi [1991];
Cochrane [1989]; Lim [1990]; Mace [1989]; Townsend [1991]), but in Udry
(1991a) I test and reject the hypothesis that a Pareto Efficient allocation is
achieved in these villages through these loan transactions.
Given that Pareto Efficiency is not achieved through these loan
transactions, their institutional structure and the information environment in
which they occur become germane.

While it appears that information moves

between borrowers and lenders in these villages more freely than is permitted
in much of the theoretical literature, the ten percent default rate on loans
implies that the possibility of some degree of information asymmetry must be
investigated.

When the promised transfer of future resources is not certain,

the character of a loan is influenced by the risks faced by the parties
involved, by their knowledge of each other and of their activities, and by the
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms associated with the loan transaction.
In this section, I make assumptions concerning the economic and
institutional environment within which the loan transactions occur.

5 Equity

Consider

investments are a common mechanism for avoiding the prohibition
by Shari'a law on fixed interest charges. See Iqbal and Abbas (1987).
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a village in which two agents ("the household" and "the partner") interact.
The model permits two sources of random variation in income; one source is
publicly observed by the entire community (and will be referred to as the
observable shock), the other is private knowledge to the recipient (and will
be referred to as the unobservable shock).

There are two periods, with S

observable "states of nature" in the second period indexed bys, each with
objective and commonly known probability of occurrence

Both agents and

~s.

the village community at large observe the realization of the state in the
second period.

There is only one good, of which the household receives an

income Ya in the opening period, while the partner receives Ya.
period they receive random observable incomes of ys and
the states of nature.

Y
5

In the next

which vary across

,

This variation in income across the S states of nature

is referred to as the observable shock.

In addition to the observable income

shock, the household and its partner respectively are subject to additional
unobservable income shocks€ and~. distributed continuously with densities
h 5 (€) and p 5 ( ~ ) , so that their total incomes are Y5 +€ and

Y+~,
5

respectively.

Given the state of nature, €and~ are distributed independently.

However,

the densities are permitted to vary across states, so€ and~ may include
unobserved village level shocks.

The supports of h 5 (€) and p 5 ( ~ ) are such

that ys + € > 0 and ys + ~ > 0 for all€ and~ such that h 5 (e) > 0 and p 5 ( ~ ) >
0.

The realization of€ is observed only by the household, and only the

partner observes the realization of~The model therefore permits two sources of variability in a household's
income which differ according to their visibility to the rest of the
community.

A wide range of informational environments, from the complete

information of Udry (1991) to drastic information asymmetry, can be
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accommodated within the model.

If information concerning farming activities

and outcomes flows freely through the village, so that all income shocks are
observable, then.the variances of g5 (€) and f 5 ( ~ ) are zero.

On the other

hand, if information concerning all income shocks is private, then Y5 =Y and

Y=Y
5

for alls.
B. A Bilateral Credit Relationship with State-Contingent Payments.
The household and its partner may make loan contracts with each other.

The loans are advanced in the initial period and repaid in the final period.
The contracts are state-contingent in the sense that the repayments owed by
the borrower may vary with the realization of the state of nature in the final
period.

The environment outlined above provides two motivations for state

contingent credit transactions by risk averse agents.
out expected consumption across the two periods.

The first is to even

If yo is below E(Y 5 +€), for

instance, the household may wish to borrow to increase initial period
consumption.

Second, both agents may wish to engage in a credit transaction

in order to reduce the variance of second period consumption through access to
any state-contingent payments that flow toward an agent who has received an
adverse realization of a second period income shock.
There are two institutional considerations that are of particular
importance to the econometric investigation which follows.

The first is the

precise manner in which the loan contracts are made state-contingent.

The

second is the mechanism which is used to enforce repayment of loan
obligations.

I will root the discussion of both of these issues in an

analysis of the role of the community, taking as a central fact the finding
that virtually all loans are transacted between residents of the same village,
or between relatives.
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A standard method of modeling contract enforcement is to consider the
transaction as one instance of a repeated interaction. 6

A default may then

be prevented by threatening the potential defaulter with exclusion from future
transactions.

Such a self-enforcing contract would flow naturally from a

repetition of the bilateral relationship modeled here.

This repeated game

approach to modeling contract enforcement, however, is inappropriate in this
setting.

The credit transactions in these villages are not repeated.

82

percent of loans occur between households which have never before engaged in a
loan transaction with each other.

These contracts do not need to be self-

enforcing because direct penalties can be imposed on defaulters.

Both

borrower and lender are members of the same community, therefore penalties for
default can be imposed by an authority of the community.

These penalties are

not explicitly codified as law, but they operate in much the same way.

The

particular enforcement mechanisms are discussed in detail in Udry (1990); for
the purposes of this discussion it is sufficient to summarize some of the main
points.

First, enforcement is carried out by village authorities or senior

members of the families involved in a dispute.

The enforcing authority has

access to the free flow of information within the village regarding farming
activities and outcomes (that is, the authority also knows the realization of
the observable shocks).

In order to reach a judgement as to whether a default

has occurred, therefore, he must know the (unwritten) contractual terms of the
loan including the state-contingent adjustments in owed repayments.

Second,

an important component of the penalties that are imposed by these authorities
is a direct utility cost to the defaulter (in the form of admonishment or
6

Recent applications of the theory of self-enforcing insurance can be
found in Thomas and Worrall (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1989), and Kletzer
and Wright (1991).
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public embarrassment).

The penalties available to the authority are

graduated, with more severe penalties imposed for more serious offenses.
The mechanism available to enforce contracts limits the domain of
outcomes over which repayments may be made contingent.

Owed repayments cannot

be made contingent upon the realization of the unobservable shocks for~. as
no incentive compatible mechanism exists which could induce a household to
reveal its true unobservable shock. 7

Therefore, I introduce state-contingent

contracting into the model by allowing owed repayments to vary across the S
observable states of nature.
The model accommodates two alternative interpretations of the manner in
which owed repayments are made contingent upon the realization of observable
shocks to the incomes of the borrower and lender.

First, the two households

might negotiate over state-contingent adjustments in owed repayments.

The

household and its partner would then be negotiating over S+l contractual
terms: the net amount lent by the household to the partner (which may be
negative) and the Sowed repayments, which vary according to the observable
shocks received by the two households.

Alternatively, in accordance with the

observation that the loans are made with very little negotiation, there are
exogenous community standards that dictate appropriate payments contingent
upon the realization of particular states. 8

If the later assumption is

correct, the task faced by the enforcement authority is eased.

He knows both

the realized state of nature and the required adjustment in owed repayments;
7 It

will be seen in section C that the possibility of default (and the
associated penalties) introduces an incentive compatible mechanism for
adjusting actual (as opposed to owed) repayments to realizations of the
unobservable shocks.
8

These standards must change over time (with, for example, technology)
but an exploration of this process is left for future work.
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in order to make a judgement as to whether a default has occurred, he needs to
learn only the size of the loan and the agreed-upon base repayment.

In this

interpretation, the state-contingent adjustments to owed repayments are
exogenous to the contracting parties; the decision to adhere to the community
norms that dictate these adjustments, however, is endogenous through the
default decision.

A test between these alternative hypotheses is presented in

section H.
If the terms of the contract, the costs of default, and both households'
utility functions are common knowledge, then the cause of a default must lie
in an income shock that raises the utility cost of repayment beyond that
expected by the lender.

The unobservable shocks€ and~. on which no

contingent payments are based, provide the variation in income that could lead
some households to default on their obligations.
The time sequence of events is as follows: the household and its
potential transaction partner have completed harvesting and have received
incomes Y0 and

Y0

from last season's production.

Based on these incomes they

negotiate over a loan, to be repaid after the following harvest.

They have

the freedom to bargain over the direction and size of the loan and over the
amount to be repaid.
in owed repayments.

They also may bargain over state-contingent adjustments
Alternatively, they share as common knowledge the

community standards that require adjustments to the amount owed depending on
the realized (observed) state of natures in the final period.

Both parties

realize that there are two sources of variance in next period incomes.

There

are observable income shocks across the S states of nature for which some
adjustment in owed repayments may be made.

The second source of income
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variation is the unobservable shock (e and~)

for which no additional

adjustment in owed repayments is made.
A deal is made and the loan is transacted.

At harvest, both discover

the realized observable shocks to each of their incomes (represented by the
state of nature) and their individual unobservable shock e or~-

The

repayment that is owed is calculated based upon the agreed upon terms (or on
the community dictated adjustments) according to the realized observable
shocks to income.

The party who owes the other, taking into account its total

income including the unobservable shock~ ore, now decides whether to
default.

Community authorities then impose penalties on any defaulter.

The notation shall be as follows.

Let L be the amount lent by the

household to its partner (if negative, the household is borrowing).

The

amount owed is determined by the agreed base repayment Rand by the negotiated
or community-determined adjustment in the amount owed as a result of the
observable shocks to both households' incomes.

Denote this adjustment if it

exists as Rs, the payment contingent upon the realization of the observable
shocks defined bys.

This payment is embedded in the loan contract and is

made simultaneously with the repayment of the loan.
payment may be positive or negative.

This state-contingent

The main hypothesis to be tested in the

empirical work of this paper is that the state-contingent payment is positive
when the realized observable states is in some sense (to be defined below)
adverse to the household, and negative when the realized state is adverse to
the partner.

Thus OWED 5 =R+Rs is the amount owed by the partner to the

household if states occurs in the final period.

The definition of the levels

of Rand Rs is arbitrary (any two levels of R can be made equivalent by adding
a constant to all R5 ) .

If the households negotiate over the state-contingent
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adjustments Rs, then without loss of generality set R1-O.
amount owed if state 1 is realized.

Thus R+R 1-R is the

Alternatively, if Rs is determined

outside the model by community norms, this ties down R.

If OWEDs is negative,

then the household owes a payment to the partner.
The budget constraints faced by the household and its transaction
partner can now be defined.
zero is Co

=

Yo-L (co

Consumption by the household (partner) in period

Yo+L).

=

Let Cs,e,,, (cs,e,,,) denote consumption by the

household (partner) in states of the final period when unobservable shocks€
and~ are received.

In the final period, the budget constraints are:

Household:

C
S,€,~

y

Partner:

C
S,€,~

y

s

+ € + OWED

-s

+

~

- OWED

s
s

when there is no default, or if the debtor defaults:
Household:

C
S,€,~

y

Partner:

C
s' € '~

y

s

-s

+ €
+

~

Both parties receive utility from consumption in the two periods.

I

will model the cost of defaulting as a direct reduction in utility in the
final period C(DEFs,e, 11 ) where DEFs,e,,, = IOWED 5 1 if the debtor defaults, and
zero otherwise.

The form of this function is discussed in section C.

The

separable Van Neuman-Morgenstern utility of the household is
1.

EU=

U(co) + fi \

L

~s [

) - C(DEFS,€,~)] hs(€) ps(~) 0€0~.

[[u(c
CX)

CX)

S,€,~

s

where U is increasing and strictly concave.
household's partner:

s

Similarly, for the
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U() and V() are both increasing, strictly concave, bounded from above, and
twice continuously differentiable.

Also assume that as

x➔ o+,

U(x) ➔-~.

The

dependence of DEFs,e,,, and DEFs,e,,, on the realized state of nature and on € and
~

must now be described. 9
C. The Default Decision.
Approximately ten percent of all loans are defaulted, therefore the

possibility of default is an important element on the model.

It will be seen

that the possibility of default and the associated enforcement technology
provides an incentive compatible mechanism which permits some adjustment in
repayments in response to the realization of unobservable shocks to income.
In this section I will explore the decision of the partner to default.

I

focus on the partner's decision because the partner may choose to default when
OWED 5 >0.

The exposition will be clarified somewhat by working with positive

quantities.

There is a utility cost to default C(DEF), which depends upon

the amount defaulted.

Assume that C(O)=O, that for DEF>O C(DEF) is

continuous and continuously twice differentiable with C'()>O, C"()<O, that C()
is bounded from above, and that as

x➔ o+,

C(x) ➔k,

k>O.

There is a fixed cost

to even a small default, and the cost of defaulting rises at a decreasing rate
with the size of the default.

The d.efault decision is made after the

realization of the observable state of natures and the unobservable income
shocks (~and€).
The decision to default is characterized in the appendix.

The fixed

cost associated with defaulting implies that in any observable states, given

9

The assumption that the utility cost of default is additively separable
is made for simplicity. The analysis of the decision to default is not
affected if the cost of default is modeled more generally as U(cs,e,,,,DEF 5 •e·").
Full details are available from the author.
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an unobservable total income ¥s +~, t h e par t ner wi. 11 d e f au lt i·f and on1y i·f th e
amount owed OWEDs is larger than a certain critical size.

I show that when

the partner owes some obligation, it will choose to default if and only if it
receives a "bad" enough unobservable shock to its income.

In any states, for

any level of repayments OWEDs, define ~s(OWEDs) as the value of the
unobservable shock~ such that the partner will choose not to default for all
~>~s(OWEDs) and will default for all ~~~s(OWEDs).

If there is a bad enough

unobservable shock to the borrower's income he will repay nothing, thus
partially smoothing the unobservable shock to his income.

The default penalty

ensures that the borrower makes his owed repayment if the unobservable shock
to his income is not too severe.
~s(OWEDs) is a continuous and continuously differentiable increasing
function of OWEDs.

It is also, therefore, a differentiable function for all

values of Rand Rs.

For all values of R, Rs and observable states of natures

such that the partner owes no repayment there is no possibility that the
partner will default.

In this instance, ~s(OWEDs) is defined so that

p(~ 5 (L,R))=P(~ 5 (L,R))=O so the probability of the partner defaulting is
correctly evaluated at zero (P(~) is the distribution function corresponding
top(~)).
defined.

Similarly, €s(OWED 5 ) (a C2 decreasing function of OWEDs) can be
€5 (0WED 5 ) is the critical value of€, below which the household will

choose some level of default and above which the household will not default.
Neither party will chose to default unless it receives a bad unobservable
shock to its income.

As the repayment owed by a party increases, less of a

bad unobservable shock is required to induce it to default.
~s(OWEDs) are abbreviated to €5 and

~s

below.

€5 (0WED 5 ) and
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D. Household Preferences over Contract Terms.
The indirect expected utility of the household is then

3.

EU= U(yo-L)

+Je:J_~u(Y 5 +e) h

5

+

p~ 1ti{:u( Y 8 +R+R 8 +e)

x (l-P 8 (11 8 )

)

h

s

(e) de

(e)p 5 (1l) dT)de + f_e~ [U(Y 5 +e) -C( l OWED 8 1)] h

8

(e) de]

The first integration is over those values of the unobservable shock€
for which the household does not choose to default in states.

The integrand

is the utility in the case of no default multiplied by the probability that
the partner does not default in states.
The second integration is over those values of€ for which the household
does not choose to default and those values of~ for which the partner does
choose to default.

If this term is not zero (that is, if ~sis large enough

that P8 ( ~ 8 ) > 0) then the integration is over the entire support of€ because
it is impossible for both the household and its partner to have a positive
probability of defaulting in the same state.

That is, if OWED 5 <0, then the

partner will never default (P 8 ( ~ 8 )=0) and this term will be zero.

If OWED 5 >0

then the household will never default, H8 (€ 8 )=0 and the integration is over
the entire support of€,

The integrand is the utility in the case of the

partner defaulting.
The final integration is over the values of€ for which the household
wants to default.
this integrand.

Therefore, the utility cost of a default is included in
It should be noted that the expected utility function depends

on the partner with whom the household is transacting.
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The indirect indifference map in (L,R)-space associated with this
utility function is drawn below (Fig. 1).
are held fixed in figure 1.

The S state-contingent payments Rs

Recall° that if the two households negotiate over

the state-contingent payments the normalization R1=0 is adopted. 10 Of course
a similar map can be drawn for the partner.

The critical feature of the

diagram is the indifference curve 1°, corresponding to the level of utility
that the household would achieve in autarky.

Note that this indifference

curve passes below the origin, reflecting the insurance benefit of access to
the state-contingent payments Rs.
the other indifference curves,
and includes the origin itself.

It should also be noted that like all of

r0

is not continuous; it has a hole at (O,R0)
The distance L0-o is the amount the household

would be willing to pay in the first period for access to the state-contingent
payments Rs in the second period (the "insurance premium").

The distance O

R0, of course, is the amount the household would be willing to pay in the
second period for access to Rs.

It is easy to show that in the vicinity of

(L0,0) (with the probability of default equal to zero), the indifference curve

1° is upward-sloping and strictly convex.

For large enough positive values of

R, default by the partner becomes virtually certain and 1° asymptotes to the
vertical line through (L0 ,0).
E. Equilibrium.
A variety of equilibrium concepts might be employed.

For instance, the

lender might choose optimally the contractual terms subject to keeping the
borrower at or above a reservation utility.

This approach, however, implies

too much asymmetry between the borrower and lender, for this is a market in

10 In this case, a map similar to figure 1 can be drawn in any (L,R 5 )

space for 2:s;s:s;s.
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which households frequently switch between borrowing and lending over time.
Instead, I adopt the symmetric Nash bargaining solution, with threat points
being no transaction, as the natural equilibrium concept.

The choice between

these alternative approaches to equilibrium has little effect on the structure
of the econometric model to follow.

The choice does have implications,

however, for certain coefficients, and in section H this will serve as the
basis of an informal test between the alternative equilibria.
I allow for the possibility that there may be transaction costs to
engaging in this loan contract.

Transaction costs could emerge, for instance,

if some effort is required to observe the states (and therefore to know the
contingent payments that are owed).

Assume that this cost is a lump sum

utility cost; this is equivalent to adding a constant to the utility at each
party's threat point.
Let EU(L,R) be the expected utility to the household from a deal
involving a loan of L to the partner, with agreed upon repayments R by the
partner to the household, where Risa scaler if we interpret the state
contingent payments as set by community norms.
3.

In this case, R=R in equation

If we adopt the alternative interpretation that the households negotiate

the state-contingent payments, then R is an S-dimensional vector.
arbitrary normalization.

R1=0 is our

In this case, the households negotiate over a base

repayment R (which is owed regardless of the realization of the state) and
over R5 for 2~s~S.
same deal.
finding

Let EV(L,R) be the expected utility to the partner of the

The symmetric Nash bargaining solution can be characterized by

18
4. Arg Max

r •

[EU(L,R) - U(Yo) - P~~SJoou(Ys:E)gs(E)dE

X

[EV(L,R) - V(Yo) -P~~s[V(Ys+~)fs(~)d~ -

L,R

where Tis the transaction cost.

The equilibriwn is pictured in figure 2. The

household's indifference curves are solid; those of the partner are dashed.
The core is the set of tangencies between the two indifference maps for which
the expected utilities achieved by each party (inclusive of transaction costs)
are greater than the expected ut~lity they achieve at the threat point.

The

bargaining solution is in the core at, say, point 1.
Some comparative statics have been calculated given that the second
order conditions are met at equilibriwn.

Ceteris paribus, an increase in

first period income increases lending (reduces borrowing).

Increased first

period income improves the terms at which a household transacts the loan;

oR/oY0 > 0.
figure 3.

The signs of the derivatives can be understood with reference to
Here the household is again the lender.

An increase in yo will

shift its entire indifference map down and to the right (it is better off at
any (L,R)) and the slope of the new 1° is smaller at the x-axis (the household
is willing to lend more at a parametric R).

Equilibriwn will shift from point

1 to point 2, with a larger loan and higher repayment.

I undertook a survey of 200 households in 4 villages near the city of
Zaria from February 1988 to February 1989.

The survey consisted of monthly

interviews with each of the household heads and (separately) his wives.

The

questionnaires were designed to yield a complete picture of each household's
asset and debt position; an account of its credit, labor, product, asset, and
asset-rental transactions over the previous month; and a range of demographic
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and background data.

For details on the study area and survey methodology,

see Udry (1990, 1991b).

Table 2 lists the variables used in this study.

Net Lending, Repayments, and Defaults - The dependent variables are

calculated from data on all loans taken or extended by a sample household for
a single main cropping period. 11

The loans included in this analysis are

those initially extended during the period from the harvest before the survey
began until the middle of the main cropping season during the survey year
(September).

By September, early crops have been harvested and some loan

repayments begin.

Net lending by household i (Li) is the nominal value of

loans extended minus loans taken during this period, while net repayments REP 1
is the net nominal value of repayments received by the household on those
loans until the end of the survey in February.

Repayments, therefore, are

measured as actual ex post transfers, not as ex ante contractual agreements.
There is no correction for price level changes over this period.

The rare

transaction made in kind is valued at the market price of the item at the time
of the transaction.

It should be noted that this bilateral model allows for

only a single transaction partner for each of the sample households.

Each of

the sample households, however, has an average of two and one half transaction
partners in the credit market.

I will assume that the loan "partners" of each

of the sample households acts as a consortium, the members of which are fixed
exogenously.

The "partners" negotiate as one against the sample household.

This study also requires an indicator of which loans have been
defaulted.

The fact that no repayments have been made on a loan is not a

sufficient indicator that the loan has been defaulted.

11

R + R5 may equal zero

In this semi-arid environment there is only one rain-fed crop per year,
with planting beginning in May.
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in states of nature in which the borrower receives an adverse observable
shock.

Therefore, a loan is considered to be in default only if no repayments

have been made and there is another indication that the borrower has not met
his obligations.

This supplementary indicator is based on the response to a

question concerning the willingness of a lender to make loans in the future to
the borrower.

If the respondent was the lender, the respondent was asked

about his or her willingness to make a loan in the future to this borrower.
If the answer was no and the respondent expected to receive no future payments
on the loan from the borrowing household, then the loan was judged to be in
default and DEFAULT was set equal to one.

If the respondent was the borrower,

the respondent was asked about the lender's willingness to make a loan to
respondent in the future.

If the response was negative and the respondent

expected to make no further payments on the loan, the loan was judged in
default and DEFAULT was set equal to one.
This is not an entirely satisfactory indicator that a default has
occurred.

Most importantly, it includes no information concerning the

triggering of any enforcement mechanisms, for instance an appeal by the lender
to the borrower's senior relatives or to village authorities concerning
repayment of the loan.
the survey.

Unfortunately, I collected no such information during

As long as at least temporary exclusion from future access to

credit from the lender is a component of the penalty for default, then the
present indicator captures all defaulted loans.

However, as there may be

other reasons for excluding a particular borrower from future access to
credit, this indicator may overstate the prevalence of default.

On the other

hand, this indicator of default errs on the conservative side in its treatment
of the timing of repayments.

No loan is considered in default as long as the
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respondent expects that further payments will be made.

This is equivalent to

assuming that the period of loans is open; as long as they are eventually
repaid, no default has occurred.

If there are misclassification errors

concerning which households have defaulted, then the likelihood function is
incorrect and the estimates will be inconsistent. 12
This measure indicates that overall, 10.3 percent of loans are
defaulted.

Respondents who were lenders reported that 8.0 percent of the

loans that they extended were defaulted.

Respondents who were borrowers

admitted that they defaulted on 14.4 percent of the loans that they had taken.
This rather surprising difference in responses (in which borrowers admit to
more defaults than lenders claim) is not statistically significant at the 5
percent level.
Observable Shocks to Income - The observable state of natures is

defined by the realization of observable shocks to the incomes of the
household and its transaction partner.

I have two indicators of the realized

observable shock to a sample household's income.

They are based on self

reported unexpected adverse events on the sample household's uplands and
lowlands farms.

The indices are weighted averages of these negative events

(examples: flooding, lodging, animal invasions) on each plot and the weights
are the relative sizes of each plot.

The indices are broken down by upland

and lowland plots because the two types of land are characterized by different
farming systems.

12 See

Upland plots are entirely rainfed and are farmed once a year

Lee and Porter (1984) for a discussion of the effect of
misclassification in an exogenous switching regression model. Freeman (1984)
discusses the impact of similar misclassification in binary choice models.
Stapleton and Young (1984) provide a cautionary note concerning measurement
error affecting the dependent variable in a Tobit model (but not causing
misclassification as censored or uncensored).
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during the rainy season.
irrigated farming.

On the lowland (fadama) plots there is dry season

Yh is the vector of these two indicators of the observable

shock to a sample household's income.

YP is the measure of the observable

shock to the income of the transaction partner.

This variable is the

proportion of the total value of loans of the sample household which was
transacted with partners who received an adverse shock between the time the
loan was made and when it was repaid.

All three of these indices are

identical to those used in table 1.
The use of these indices depends upon the assumption that the events
used in their construction are observable to the village community (including
the household, its partner, and family and village authorities) and are
exogenous to the behavior of the agents.

The first assumption is strongly

supported by the evidence presented Udry (1990) that information concerning
farming activities and outcomes flows freely within the village.

The second

assumption is more problematic, for while some events which enter the index
are plausibly exogenous (e.g. animal invasions), others are not.

The

probability of lodging or flooding, for example, can be influenced by farming
practices.

However, if farming activities themselves are observable to the

community, the moral hazard otherwise arising from the endogeneity of these
events can be controlled.
Unobservable Shocks to Income - The household's decision to default is
affected by the realization of€ - the unobservable shock to household income
for which there is no state-contingent adjustment in owed repayments.

For

these agricultural households, the most important element of€ is the
accumulation of the myriad of tiny variations in the quality and timing of
inputs that causes significant variation in yields from year to year.

Seed
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quality and the day-to-day timing of rainfall are examples of variables with
significant random components that are important, at least according to these
farmers, in the determination of yield.

In order to measure the cumulative

effect of variations in these inputs I use the value of per hectare yield on
the household's upland and lowlands farms.
vector Z.

These two variables compose the

Sample households could not provide information concerning the

yields of non-sample households, so no measure of the unobservable shock to
the partner household's income can be constructed.
The use of this measure of€ depends upon the assumption that no
contingent payments are made based on its components.

This assumption will be

justified if the components of Z are in fact unobservable to the village
community.

This is not a necessary condition, however.

It is sufficient that

no community standard (R5 ) calls for a contingent payment on the realization
of an element of Z.

The use of Zin this specification also depends on the

assumption that its realization is econometrically exogenous to the credit
market activities of the household.

This assumption is more problematic; I

will return to it during the discussion of the results.
Z may also be subject to important measurement error, as different
farmers are likely to have systematically different methods for estimating
their output.

A better measure could be based on a 'difference of

differences' variable which would use the difference between this year's yield
(relative to the village average) and last year's yield (relative to last
year's village average).

However, this is as much a measure of last year's

'unobservable' shock as it is of this year's, and thus would have to be
included in the loan size and owed repayment equations as well as in the
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default equation, and thus could not provide an instrument to identify the
default decision.
Village effects (Xv) - Village dummy variables capture village-specific

effects.

There are differences in infrastructure, soil quality, and market

access across the four villages which will affect the net supply of credit.
The different villages will have been subject to different random production
shocks in the previous cropping year and this will also affect the net supply
of credit.

These same factors will influence the negotiation over repayment.

The village dummy variables act as predictors of income, and therefore must be
included in the default equations for both the sample households and their
partners.

Also, the village dummy variables are likely to influence the

default decision because of differences in the social environments of the
different villages which affect the availability of information and
enforcement mechanisms needed to support these credit transactions.
Household Characteristics (Xh) - The wealth variable (WEALTH) is equal

to the value of holdings of grain, trading stocks, livestock, and household
goods (durable consumer goods such as radios, housewares, and farming
implements) at the start of the survey.

As discussed in section E, an

increase in wealth is expected to increase the net supply of credit (or reduce
the net demand for credit).

In addition to increasing net lending, increased

wealth also increases a household's disagreement payoff.

Net repayments to

the household, therefore, should increase with increased wealth.

If the

sample household owes a repayment, an increase in its wealth should reduce the
likelihood that it will default (by increasing second period income).
The SKILLS variable is a dummy variable indicating the presence of at
least one household member with a special skill.

Such skills include
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carpentry, traditional medicine, tailoring, or being a religious teacher.
This variable should act as a fixed asset, increasing the demand for working
capital in order to use the skill, and thus decreasing the net lending of the
household and worsening the terms at which loan transactions are made.

Net

repayments to the household should decrease in the presence of a skilled
household member.

SKILLS is included in the default equation for borrowers

because of its effect on income.

Higher skills should be correlated with

higher income and therefore a lower likelihood of default.

This correlation

and its effect on default will tend to improve the terms at which the
household borrows and makes the final effect of skills on owed repayments and
net lending indeterminate when the household is a borrower.
Land ownership is broken down into upland plots (UPLAND) and lowland
plots (LOWLAND) because the different types of land require different levels
of inputs.

Lowlands require much more intensive inputs than do uplands

(because the soil is heavier, and because farming can continue year-round).
Land ownership should affect net lending, the owed repayment, and the default
decision in much the same way as SKILLS.

That is, increased land holdings

should reduce net lending, worsen the terms at which loan transactions are
made, and reduce the incidence of default.
The age of the household head (AGE) should influence net lending and
repayments in the same way as other fixed assets. 13

Older household heads

should have lower net lending and the terms at which the household transacts
loans should become worse.

These results, however, were derived assuming that

the probability of default was negligible.

If older household heads are more

13 Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1985) propose plot-specific farming experience
as one important route through which age could have an important affect.
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able to utilize village mechanisms to enforce loans they have made, or are
more subject to the discipline of village authorities when they borrow, then
the affect of age on repayments becomes indeterminate.
G. Model Specification.
In this section I develop an econometric specification of loan
transactions based on the model of the preceding sections.

Each of the sample

households is assumed to be engaged in a bilateral credit relationship.

The

empirical work below is characterized in terms of net lending by the sample
household and net repayments to the sample household.
The first order conditions of equation 4 implicitly define net-lending
as a function of characteristics of the household and its partner:
L=L(Xhh ,~artner).

The comparative statics of "this equilibrium are complicated,

but as noted above, the derivatives of the reduced form do not switch signs
depending on net borrowing/lending status as long as the Nash solution is
symmetric. Similarly, there is a reduced form for base repayments
R=R(Xhh•~artner) ·

As noted above, the terms at which credit is transacted are implicit;
the owed repayment is not observed.
observed repayments.

It must therefore be estimated from

If we adopt the interpretation that any state-contingent

adjustments in owed repayments are exogenously determined by community norms,
then the amount owed in state s is OWED 5 =R(Xhh,~artner) + R5
in those instances in which there is no default.

•

OWED 5 is observed

R5 is not observed, but is a

function only of the observed states which is realized in the final period.
Alternatively, if the state-contingent payments are negotiated by the two
parties, then R5 =R 5 (Xhh,~artner).

In either case the contractual repayment R is

independent of observable shocks, but depends upon a range of household
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characteristics, while the state-contingent payment R5 depends on the
realization of observable shocks.
exclusion restrictions.

Rs and R therefore are identified though

It is poss.ible to test between our two hypotheses

concerning the determination of the state-contingent payments.

Evidence that

household characteristics help predict these payments supports the notion that
they are negotiated rather than determined by community norms.
As described in section C, the default decision of the household (if it
owes a repayment) depends on its realized final period income, the amount it
owes, and the utility cost of defaulting.

One component of the income of the

household is the unobservable income shock

E

that it receives.

The·

contractual repayment R is independent of this unobservable income shock in
the final period because it is set before the realization of€.

Owed

repayments are contingent upon the realization of the observable state of
nature only, so Rs is also independent of€.

The measure of this shock (Z)

will therefore serve to identify the default decision of the household.

An

analogous measure of the unobservable income shock received by the partner
would serve to identify its default decision.

No such measure is available,

however, so the amount defaulted by the partner is identified only though the
non-linearity of the optimal default schedule.
The reduced forms for both L(.) and R(.) include characteristics of both
the household and its partner.

During the fieldwork, attempts were made to

collect information concerning the transaction partners, but they met with
only minor success.

Sample households in general refused to reveal the

identity of their partners and would provide only limited information
concerning them.
variables bias.

The estimation that follows therefore is affected by omitted
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The system to be estimated is set forth below.
subscripts are omitted.

Individual household

Equations (Sa) and (Sb) define net lending (Lis

positive when a loan is made from

a

sample household to its partner).

The

friction represented by k1 is required by the possibility of transaction costs
(introduced in eq. 4).

An asterisk indicates that a variable is latent.

(borrowing)
(lending)
Equation 6 defines the net repayments owed to sample households (OWED*
is positive for a repayment to a sample household from its partner).

6.

if 1#0

OWED *
[ 0

if L=O.

Recall that Yh and YP consist of the indicators of the observable shocks
to the incomes of the household and the partner.

Together, they define the

observable state on natures, which in turn determines the stat-contingent
payment R5 •

Yh and YP identify any state-contingent payments contained within

the loan repayments.

Indicators of observable shocks received by both the

household and its partner are included in the estimation of the repayment
equation because the state-contingent payments may depend on the shocks
received by both parties.

The central hypothesis tested below is that the

state-contingent payments serve to pool risk between the household and its
partner by flowing toward the party which has received a particularly adverse
observable shock.
Equations 7a and 7b describe a sample household's default decision.
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7.

if the household is a borrower:

a.

D*

b.

[REP
REP

Xv10 + ~11 + Yh12 + Z1 3 + 1 4 0WED* +
0 and D = 1
*>0
i f D.
OWED * and D - 0

*

if D

~
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0.

The default decision depends upon the household's income and the amount owed,
given the cost of a default.

Village dummy variables Xv are included to

capture the effect of village residence on both income and the (community
determined) cost of a default.
as predictors of income.

Household specific variables Xh are included

For the same reason the indices of observable (Yh)

and unobservable (Z) shocks to the household's income are included.
Equations 8a and 8b describe a partner's default decision.
8.
a.

if the sample household is a lender:

*

D

b. [REP
REP

XvAO + YpAl + A20WED * +
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0 and D = 1 if D* > 0
OWED* and D = 0 if D*

~

0.

Village dummy variables are again included because of their effect on both the
partner household's income and the cost of a default.

Equations 7 and 8

should be identical, but no household characteristics of the partner are
available.

The only available household level indicator of the partner's

income is Yp, the index of observable adverse shocks affecting the partner
household.

I have no measure of farm yields for non-sample households, so no

measure of the unobservable income shock received by the partner household can
be constructed.
The random variables

11 1 ,

11 2 ,

11 3

and

11 4

are assumed to be jointly normally

distributed with zero mean and covariance matrix~-

The parameters of the

default decisions (eqs. 7-8) are identified only up to scale, so the variances
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of v 3 and v 4 are set to unity.

The contribution of each observation to the

likelihood function can be found in the appendix.
As noted above, L*, OWED*, and D* are latent variables, while L, I, REP,
and Dare observed.

The covariance between v 3 and v 4 cannot be identified at

all, as it has no effect on observed outcomes.

The Rosett-type friction of

equation 5 is identified through its non-linearity; no variables are available
to identify the friction independently of the determinants of loan size.
Equation 7 is identified by the vector Z, which affects the amount defaulted
but not the repayment owed.

Equation 8 is identified only through its non

linear structure, as I have no measure pf the yields achieved on the-partners'
plots.
The assumption that the idiosyncratic shocks (both Y and Z) are serially
uncorrelated is critical.

However, as long as the deviation of the household

level shock from the village shock is not serially correlated, the estimates
are consistent.

Net lending L* is affected by last year's idiosyncratic

shocks (Yt-i and Zt-i).

This dependence is captured in the random variable vi.

If the idiosyncratic shocks are serially correlated, then Vi is correlated
with Yh, YP and Zand the estimates are inconsistent.

Serial correlation in

shocks that affect the entire village are not problematic, as they are
reflected in the coefficients of the village dummy variables.
H. Estimation Results.
I present FIML estimates of the base specification in table 3, and some
variations on this base model in tables 4-5.

Each variation is a

31
generalization of the base model, so that nested tests of the significance of
each generalization can be made. 14
State-contingent payments - The results presented in section B of table

3 indicate that observable shocks received by sample households after a loan
is extended improve the terms at which the loan is repaid.

Observable shocks

received by a household's partner worsen the terms faced by the sample
household.

The point estimates imply that a one standard deviation adverse

shock to the household's lowland plots is associated with a N61 contingent
payment to the household (the average amount lent is N191, or about $40).

A

one standard deviation adverse shock received by the household's partner leads
to a N29 contingent payment by the household to its partner.

The point

estimate of the impact of observable shocks ~n the household's upland plots
indicates that the household receives only a NS contingent payment for a one
standard deviation shock, and the coefficient is not significantly different
from zero.

The results confirm the hypothesis that owed repayments are state

contingent, and that this flexibility allows for direct risk pooling between
borrowers and lenders. 15
The finding that state-contingent payments are made in response to the
realization of observable shocks on lowlands plots, but not on upland plots
(the data on shocks realized by transaction partners do not differentiate
between uplands and lowlands) is not untenable, as lowland and upland land
14 The

tables are based on specifications which gain efficiency by
imposing the restriction that the covariances a 13 , a 14 , a 23 and a 24 are zero.
The likelihood ratio test of the joint restriction that these covariances are
zero yields a x2 (4) test statistic of .6, which is insignificantly different
from zero. Moreover, no coefficient changes sign in the unrestricted
specification, nor is there any statistically significant change in any
estimate.
15 This

confirms the central findings of Udry (1990) and Udry (1991).
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historically have been treated differently in a number of respects, from land
tenure to farming practices. 16

Furthermore, upland plots are dispersed

throughout the land surrounding the· village, while lowland plots are
concentrated on the banks of the few streams near each village.

Therefore it

is easier to monitor events on transaction partners' lowland plots than on
their upland plots.
In order to test the hypothesis that the state-contingent payments are
negotiated rather than set by community norms, the model was estimated with
interactions between the indicators of observable shocks and various household
characteristics.

Three different specifications were estimated.

First,

interactions were allowed between adverse shocks on the different types of
land and the area owned of each type of land.

The likelihood ratio test of

the restriction that the interaction coefficients are zero yields a x2 (4) test
statistic of 3.4, which is not significantly different from zero at the 5
percent level.

There is no evidence, therefore, that the payment which is

contingent upon receipt of a particular adverse observable shock varies
according to the size of the plot affected by the shock.

Second, I added

interactions between the village dummy variables and the indicators of adverse
observable shocks.

The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that these

interaction coefficients are zero yields a

x2 (6) test statistic of 7.0, which

is not significantly different from zero.

The size of the state-contingent

payments does not seem to vary across the four villages.

Finally, I permitted

interactions between all the household characteristics (Xh) and the indicators
of observable shocks.

The x2 (10) likelihood ratio test statistic of the

restriction that these interactions are zero is 10.4, which again is not
16

See Norman (1972), Hill (1977) and Ega (1984).
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significantly different from zero.

There is no evidence, therefore, that the

state-contingen t payments depend on the characteristics of the household.
This series of tests provides no support for the hypothesis that households
negotiate over the state-contingen t payments which are embedded in these loan
transactions.

Rather, there seem to be community standards that prescribe

appropriate payments contingent on the realization of particular observable
shocks. 17
Table 4 reports the results of a specification which permits the
coefficients of the indices of observable adverse events to vary according to
the sample household's net borrower/net lender status.

The results in section

B show that when adverse shocks are received by sample households who are net
borrowers, they pay back less.

Similarly, when the sample household is the

lender, an adverse shock received by its transaction partner is associated
with lower repayments to the household.

These results could be consistent

with conventional models of loan contracting, as the lower repayments might
simply reflect a higher incidence of default on the part of borrowers who
receive adverse shocks.

Here, however, the results control for the default

status of the borrower.

Owed repayments, therefore, depend on the realization

of adverse shocks by the borrower.

This finding is consistent with a notion

of a loan as an equity investment in the borrower's enterprise, an appropriate
form of lending under Shari'a law.

17 Community

norms which dictate risk sharing between households are an
oft-cited element of the 'moral economy' or 'subsistence ethic' which has been
hypothesized to provide a measure of security in peasant communities in risky
environments (Scott [1976]; Watts [1983]). The present model may be
interpreted as an effort to place an analysis of rural credit based on
household optimizing behavior within the context of a village moral economy.

34

Even more striking, however, are the results in section B of table 4
which indicate that when adverse shocks are received by lenders, they are paid
back more.

When the sample household is the lender, adverse shocks on its

lowland plots are associated with higher repayments to the household.
Similarly, when the sample household is the borrower, adverse shocks affecting
its transaction partner are associated with higher repayments by the sample
household.

In fact, there is no statistically significant difference between

the responses of repayments to adverse shocks received by net lenders and net
borrowers.

A likelihood ratio test of the restriction that the coefficients

of the indices of adverse shocks are the same for net lenders and net
borrowers yields a x2 (3) test statistic of 0.4, which is not significantly
different from zero at the 10 percent level.

This provides no evidence,

therefore, against the hypothesis of symmetric Nash equilibrium; borrowers and
lenders appear to be treated symmetrically.
Household characteristics - Turn now to the other results from the base

specification.

The net lending equation reported in section A of table 3

confirms the hypothesis of transaction costs in lending.
coefficient is significantly different from zero.

The friction

As expected, households

with higher levels of wealth holdings at the start of the sample year have
higher net lending.

The effect of wealth on repayments, however, is

insignificant.
Ownership of upland and lowland land affect net lending in opposite
directions.

Households with larger holdings of upland plots tend to lend

more, while households with larger holdings of lowlands borrow more (though
this latter coefficient is only marginally significant).
higher working capital requirements of lowlands plots.

This may reflect the
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Households containing at least one family member with a special skill
borrow, on average, N63 more than other households.

This result is in

accordance with the expectation that extra working capital would be required
to employ these skills.

Similarly, households with older household heads have

significantly less net lending than those headed by younger men.

In another

specification (not reported), I included measures of the household head's
formal education (both western and Islamic).

Neither measure had any

significant effect on the household's behavior in the credit market and a test
of the joint significance of the education variables yields a x2 (4) test
statistic of only 2.4.

These findings are in accordance with the hypothesis

advanced by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1989) that farming experience rather than
formal education is an important determinant of farming ability in risky but
stationary environments.
The estimates of the default equation for the household and its partner
are presented in section C of table 3.

As expected, after controlling for

observable adverse events, households which received lower yields are more
likely to default.

Also in accordance with theoretical expectations,

households which owed higher repayments were more likely to default.

In order

to explore the consequences of omitted variables in the partner's default
equation, section C of table 5 presents estimates from a specification which
permitted the effects of owed repayments on the default decision to vary
between sample households and their partners.

There is no significant

difference between the two coefficients.
A household's wealth has no significant effect on the default decision.
Households with larger land holdings are significantly more likely to default,
contrary to theoretical expectation.

An observable shock on its land reduces
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the probability of default by the household.

This is a puzzling result

because the theoretical model implies that a reduction in income should
increase the probability of default".

It is possible that after an adjustment

in owed repayments has been made in response to receipt of a shock, the cost
of defaulting increases.

It is interesting, however, that observable shocks

affecting the household's partner increase the probability of default by the
partner, though the coefficient is only marginally significant.
The village dummy variables play an important role in each equation.
They capture a variety of different collinear effects including village level
shocks, infrastructure, and the socially-determined costs of default.
I. Conclusions.
One of the primary motivations for borrowing in agricultural societies
is to stabilize consumption in the face of fluctuating incomes.

Households

borrow more when they suffer an adverse shock and they lend more when they are
favored with a positive shock.

Credit transactions in rural northern Nigeria

play a more direct role in pooling risk between households.

Repayments owed

on a loan depend upon the realization of random production and consumption
shocks by both borrower and lender.

The restriction of loan transactions to

agents within a small social space allows the free flow of information between
borrower and lender that is necessary to support state-contingent contracting
and provides access to community-based mechanisms to monitor and enforce the
contracts.

The results of this paper confirm that state-contingent payments

which flow to the recipients of adverse shocks are embedded within loan
repayments.
The estimation carried out in this paper is based on a bilateral model
of loan contracting.

This model admits a wide range of assumptions concerning
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the flow of information within the village. It also permits an investigation
of the decision by a household to default on its repayment obligations.

Most

importantly, this approach captures· at least a portion of the rich social and
institutional context within which the loans are transacted.
Nevertheless, the weaknesses of this approach must be acknowledged.
Some are technical, and have been detailed in the body of the paper.

These

include the drought of information concerning the transaction partners of
sample households; the difficulty of determining whether or not a default has
occurred; and the assumptions that are required to identify the default
decisions of the transaction partners of the sample households.
weaknesses are necessary consequences of the approach taken.

Other

By focusing

attention on the loan transaction itself, the properties of the general
equilibrium are lost.

More generally, the two primary actors in the model

interact within the rules set by the small community in which they reside, but
they make no contribution to any changes which occur in that community.

I

have treated the community as autonomous, setting norms of behavior and
providing neutral monitoring and enforcing authority.

This has enabled me to

analyze the behavior of optimizing agents within the context of their
community, but provides no mechanism for exploring the community itself.

This

work, therefore, invites extensions which .move away from this partial
equilibrium method.

Most simply, the Nash bargaining game could be

generalized to allow for community-wide rather than bilateral equilibrium.
More ambitious research would focus on changes in the community norms and
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms which set the context for these state
contingent loan transactions.
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APPENDIX: THE DEFAULT DECISION

Consider a given state of natures.

Let z =

Y+~
5

and OWED= R+R5

The

•

partner will default if the benefit· from defaulting U(z)-C(OWED) -U(z-OWED)>O.
Recall that U() is continuous and that the limit as
Therefore, the limit as

OWEO➔ O+

➔

-ro

➔ ro.

For a small

Because the limit as

and C(x) is bounded from above the limit as

U(z)-C(OWED)-(z-OWED)

of C(x)=k>O.

of U(z)-C(OWED)-U(z-OWED) = -k<O.

enough amount owed, the partner will not default.
of U(x)

x➔o+

OWEO➔ z-

x➔o+

of

U() and C() are continuous, so there exists some

OWED* such that U(z)-C(OWED*)-U(z-OWED*)=O.
OWED) is strictly convex and the limit as

Because B(OWED)=U(z)-C(OWED)-U(z
OWEO➔ O+

< 0, OWED* is unique (see

figure Al).

·k
Now consider a given level of OWED=R+R5 >0.
B(z)=U(z)-C(OWED)-u(z-OWED).

Define

The limit as z ➔OWED+ of B(z) ➔

ro

Because U()

increasing, concave and bounded from above, the limit as z➔ro of B(z)
=C(OWED)<O.
unique.

Therefore, there is some z 0 such that B(z 0 )=0.

8B/8z<O, so z 0 is

z 0 (0WED) is a continuous and continuously differentiable function

implicitly defined by B(z 0 (0WED))-O.

From the implicit function formula,

~zC = _ u'(z"-OWED) -C1 (0WED)
~OWED
u'(z") -u'(z"-OWED)

>O
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because the denominator is negative and the numerator is positive when
B(z)=O.

zc is implicitly defined as a differentiable function of OWED for all

OWED>O, with zc'(OWED)>O.
OWEl}+O+,

zc(OWED) ➔O

and

Define ~c(OWED) = zc(OWED) - Y.

Note that as

~c(OWED) ➔ -Y.

The critical value of random income ~c(OWED) is now defined.

Note

however that ~c is not defined for OWED<O, for in such situations the partner
never defaults.

In order to avoid technical difficulties is describing the

equilibrium in section E, it is useful to define an arbitrary continuation of
the function ~c(OWED) for values of OWED less than zero which is continuous
and differentiable for all values of OWED.

I have dropped all state

superscripts to avoid notational clutter during this discussion.

But the

critical value of random income obviously varies across states of nature.
Therefore, for each states, define ~5 (OWED 5 ) as equal to the function
~c(OWED) as discussed above for this state for all OWED 5 >O, and equal to any
arbitrary differentiable continuation of this function for OWED 5 ~O.

APPENDIX: THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION

There are five observationally distinct cases, depending upon the
borrowing/lending and default status of each household.

I have dropped the i

subscripts; each equation refers to an individual observation.

The contribution of

each observation to the likelihood function is as follows:
Case 1: L < 0, the household is a net borrower:
Al.

v

1

= L - Xa

Subcase (a): D = 0:
= REP - xp

A2.

and v

A3.

and fl= v 3+1 4 v 2< -[Xv1 0+ ~1 1+ Yh1 2 + Z1 3 + 1 4 (xp 0+Yp 1 )].

2

0

- Yp

1

Subcase (b): D = 1, REP= 0:
and fl~ -[X1 0 + X1 + Yh1 + Z1 + 1 4 (xp + Yp )].
1
2
3
0
1

A4.
If v

2

and v

3

.
.
have mean zero, variances
a 2 an d a 2 an d covariance
2

3

2
2
2 2
a 23 , th;n af = a 3 +(1 4 ) ·a 2
a2f= 1 4a2 + a23·
Case 2: L > 0, the household is a net lender:
AS.

v

1 = L + kL - Xa

Subcase (a): D = 0:
A6.

and

A7.

and

f2 = v4+AV2 <

-[XvAO+ YpAl + A2(XPo+ YP1)l

Subcase (b): D = 1, REP= 0:

AB.

and

f2

~

-[XvAO + YpAl + A2 (xp 0+ Yp 1 )]

The covariance matrix of f
Case 3:

2

and ~

2

is defined similarly to that of fl and ~ .
1

L = 0 ,the household neither borrows nor lends):
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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Realized Terms vs. Borrower and Lender Shocks Received
Sample means
Adverse shock
received by:

monthly rate of
return

(A) Borrower
-no shock

0.5%

20.4%

67

-4.0%

-0.6%

72

lower
(1. 58)

lower
(2.20)

longer
(1.03)

-7.5%

-5.0%

89

2.6%

11.8%

80

higher
(4.56)

higher
(3.06)

shorter
(1. 89)

-shock
Impact of shock
on mean:
(t)

simple rate of
return

repayment
period in days

(B) Lender

-no shock
-shock
Impact of shock
on mean:
(t)

The impact of the shocks is judged by a two-sided t-test of equal means
The absolute value of the t-statistic is in parentheses.

(~oshock

µshock).

The measure of 'adverse shock' is:
1. A respondent (borrower or lender) is judged to have received an adverse
shock if he reported an unexpected adverse event on any of the fields he farms during
the term of the loan. Common events were flooding, wind damage, or infestation by
insects.
2. The other party (borrower or lender) is judged to have received an adverse
shock if the respondent reported an unexpected, serious event that occurred in the
other household during the term of the loan. Common events were farming events as in
(1), and medical problems, rain damage to houses, and other 'household emergencies.'
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Table 2: Variables Used
Mean
A. Dependent Variables

NET LENDING : net amount lent (x NlOO)*

1. 91

24.16

REPAYMENT:

net amount repaid (xNlOO) ·
(to sampie household by others)

2.50

26.75

indicator of default on loan

0.16

0.37

2.25

45.12

40.64

12.23

DEFAULT:

B. Household Characteristics (Xh)

WEALTH:

value of livestock, household articles,
grain and trading stocks evaluated at the
start of the survey (xlOOO).

AGE :

age in years of household head.

HERELONG

dummy variable. 1 if family of household
head has been in village 2 or more
generations.

0.68

0.47

SKILLS

dummy variable. 1 if at least one member
of household has special skills.

0.60

0.24

UPLAND :

gona (upland) land owned in hectares.

3.24

4.69

LOWLAND :

fadama (lowland) land owned in hectares.

0.44

1.04

C. Indicators of Observable Shocks to Household Income (Yb)
UPROBLEM:

index of self-reported problems
on upland farms.

0.22

0.35

LPROBLEM

index of self-reported problems
on lowland farms.

0.27

0.26

0.20

0.30

D. Indicator of Observable Shocks to Partner Income (Yp)
PARTPROB :

proportion of loans with partners who
received adverse shocks

E. Indicators of Unobservable Shocks to Household Income (Z)

UYIELD

log of per-hectare yield on upland farms

-0.49

1.20

LYIELD

log of per-hectare yield on lowland farms

-0.54

0.83

*The Nigerian currency is the Naira. The exchange rate ranged from $1 = N4 in
February 1988 to $1 = N7 in February 1989.
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Table 3: Bilateral Model FIML Estimates
A. Net Lending Equation (positive -lending from the household to the partner):

Variable

Parameter

CONSTANT
VILI.AGEl
VILI.AGE2
VILI.AGE3
WEALTH
AGE
SKILLS
UPLAND
LOWLAND

5.885
-2.304
-3.029
-1.373
0.138
-0.070
-0.629
0.405
-0. 372

26.32
-10.44
-13. 77
-6.22
2.10
-3.76
-3.14
3.67
-1. 86

FRICTION CUTOFF:
a

4.499

21. 39

7.944

41. 75

B. Net Repayment Equation (positive-repayments from partner to the household):

Variable

Parameter

T-Ratio

CONSTANT
VILI.AGEl
VILI.AGE2
VILI.AGE3
WEALTH
AGE
SKILLS
UPLAND
LOWLAND

1.982
0.790
-1. 808
-1.150
0.083
-0.026
-1.095
0.257
-0.248

8.91
3.62
-8.33
-5.26
1. 24
-1. 57
-5. 77
2.81
-1. 33

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS:
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS
LOAN PARTNER
a
rhol2

0.220
2.263
-1.427

1.00
10.17
-6.45

6. 217

35.21
19.13

0.759
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Table 3: Bilateral Model FIML Estimates (Continued)
C. Default Equation:

Variable

Parameter·

CONSTANT
- sample households
- transaction partner
VILLAGEl
VILLAGE2
VILLAGE3
WEALTH
GONA
FADAMA

T-Ratio

0.745
-4.488
-1.123
-0.025
-1.014
0.018
0. 776
0.770

-0.11
-4.50
0.24
8.20
3.41

-4.787
-8.011
2.124

-2.14
-3.59
0.94

ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS

-3.153
-8. 778

-1.40
-3.95

AMOUNT OWED

5.782

28.12

3.33
2.03
-5.13

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS:
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS
LOAN PARTNER
FARM YIELD:

-LN(Likelihood) = 1209.0
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Table 4: Testing the Responsiveness of Contract Terms to Shocks:
Sample Households vs. Partner Households
A. Net Lending Equation (positive -lending from the household to the partner):
Variable

Parameter

T-Ratio

CONSTANT
VILLAGEl
VILLAGE2
VILLAGE3
WEALTH
AGE
SKILLS
UPLAND
LOWLAND

5.884
-2.304
-3.030
-1.375
0.138
-0.070
-0.630
0.405
-0.373

26.31
-10.44
-13. 77
-6.23
2.10
-3.76
-3.14
3.67
-1. 86

FRICTION CUTOFF:
a

4.492

21. 36

7.942

41. 74

B. Net Repayment Equation (positive-repayments from partner to the household):
Variable

Parameter

T-Ratio

CONSTANT
VILLAGEl
VILLAGE2
VILLAGE3
WEALTH
AGE
SKILLS
UPLAND
LOWLAND

2.005
0.765
-1.831
-1.173
0.083
-0.026
-1.097
0.259
-0.251

9.01
3.51
-8.43
-5.36
1. 24
-1. 59
-5.78
2.83
-1.34

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS:
Borrowing Households
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS
LOAN PARTNER

0.221
2.273
-1. 408

a
rhol2

1.00
10.21
-6.37
7.947
0.760

Lending Households
0.071
2.000
-1.112
41. 75
19.14

0.31
8.83
-4.91
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Table 4: Sample Households vs. Partner Households (Continued)
C. Default Equation:

Variable

Parameter·

CONSTANT
- sample households
- transaction partner
VILI.AGEl
VILI.AGE2
VILI.AGE3
WEALTH
GONA

T-Ratio

-2.209
-8.030
-0.083
-0.025
-1. 451
0.388
1. 291
0.873

-9.86
-3.69
-0.37
-0.11
-6.43
4.39
12.12
3.86

-5.900
-13.060
8.335

-2.63
-5.83
3.69

ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS

-10.536
-14.358

-4.66
-6.42

AMOUNT OWED

8.611

40.67

FADAMA

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS:
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS
LOAN PARTNER
FARM YIELD:

-LN(Likelihood) = 1208.9
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Table 5: Generalized Default Equation
A. Net Lending Equation (positive -lending from the household to the partner):

Variable

Parameter

T-Ratio

CONSTANT
VILI.AGEl
VILI.AGE2
VILI.AGE3
WEALTH
AGE
SKILLS
UPI.AND
LOWLAND

5.884
-2.303
-3.029
-1.373
0.138
-0.070
-0.629
0.405
-0. 372

26.31
-10.43
-13.76
-6.22
2.10
-3.76
-3.14
3.67
-1. 86

FRICTION CUTOFF:
a

4.499

21. 38

7.944

41. 74

B. Net Repayment Equation (positive-repaym ents from partner to the household):

Variable

Parameter

T-Ratio

CONSTANT
VILI.AGEl
VILI.AGE2
VILI.AGE3
WEALTH
AGE
SKILLS
UPI.AND
LOWLAND

1.988
0.784
-1. 812
-1.156
0.083
-0.026
-1.095
0.257
-0.249

8.93
3.59
-8.35
-5.28
1. 24
-1. 58
-5.76
2.81
-1. 33

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS:
ON UPI.ANDS
ON LOWLANDS
LOAN PARTNER
a

rhol2

0.225
2.268
-1. 430

1.02
10.19
-6.46

6.217
0.757

35.21
19.12
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Table 5: Generalized Default Equation (Continued)
C. Default Equation:

Variable

Parameter

CONSTANT
- sample households
- transaction partner
VILIAGEl
VILIAGE2
VILIAGE3
WEALTH
GONA
FADAMA

T-Ratio

0.484
-4.320
-1. 506
-0.247
-1.298
0.021
0.745
0.122

-6.74
-1.09
-5.73
0.94
3.35
0.53

-4.932
-8.252
1.789

-2.23
-3. 71
0.79

-3.040
-8.929

-1. 35
-4.02

5.761
5.962

27.82
26. 71

2.23
-1. 97

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS:
ON UPIANDS
ON LOWIANDS
LOAN PARTNER
FARM YIELD:
ON UPIANDS
ON LOWIANDS
AMOUNT OWED
- Sample Households
- Partner Households

-LN(Likelihood) = 1208.9
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